There is a lot of left-leaning content available in French! They have a lot of scholars and thinkers who are openly leftists, and in Europe it will not scare anyone.

One source I found is this: https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/22/americas/cuba-crisis-energy-economy-intl-latam

It was translated in Italian and shared by several Italian news outlets.

The article I shared is about Liberal-Idealist paradigm in geopolitics, which is a very specific topic. However, let’s analyze your claims.

According to polls conducted by the Levada Center (an independent sociological institution recognized in Russia as a “foreign agent”), only about 16% of Russians support the Western model of democracy, while 50% advocate a “special Russian democracy,” which in practice often serves as a camouflage for authoritarianism. At the same time, only 5% believe that Russia does not need democracy at all.

However, low turnout in elections (for example, 48% in the 2016 State Duma elections) and indifference to formal institutions of power do not mean a rejection of democratic ideals as such. Many citizens do not see the connection between democracy and solving pressing problems (poverty, corruption, unemployment). In addition, state propaganda successfully creates the image of a “besieged fortress,” where democracy is associated with vulnerability to external threats.

The majority of Russians want not so much Western-style liberal democracy as social stability, justice, and respect for basic rights. Democratic institutions are perceived as a tool, not as a value in itself.

In Russia, “liberals” refer to supporters of the Western model of democracy, market economy, human rights, and pro-Western foreign policy. They are often accused of lacking patriotism and blindly copying foreign designs. In the United States, “conservatives” (especially of the libertarian persuasion) also advocate limiting the state, low taxes, and individual freedoms: for values that in Russia are associated with liberalism.

However, this similarity is superficial. American conservatism includes a strong component of religious traditionalism, support for a strong army, and anti-communism, which is unusual for Russian liberals. In addition, Russian “liberals” often advocate social guarantees and the role of the state in the economy, which brings them closer to American social liberals.

There is irony, but it is conditioned by a different historical and cultural context. In Russia, where the traditions of individualism and a limited state are weak, liberalism is perceived as alien and “Western,” while in the United States the same ideas are part of the conservative mainstream.

This sequence of events is not a malfunction of the Democratic Party; it is the system operating exactly as designed. The capitalist state, of which the Democratic Party is one of the two primary managerial factions, exists to protect the interests of the bourgeoisie and maintain the dictatorship of capital.

The cases of Mamadani and Fateh, who ran on platforms critical of the Israeli state and perhaps even mildly social-democratic in a local context, demonstrate the party establishment’s red lines. Figures like Schumer and Jeffries are not merely politicians with differing opinions; they are direct representatives of monopoly capital, particularly its imperialist and finance wings. Their refusal to endorse candidates who challenge the sacred cow of Zionism, a key ideological pillar of U.S. imperialism in the Middle East, is a class imperative. The same logic applies to the targeted removal of Bowman and Bush by AIPAC-funded campaigns. AIPAC functions not as a simple lobby, but as a political enforcement mechanism for the imperialist bourgeoisie within the electoral arena. It ensures that any deviation from unwavering support for a key imperialist ally is met with overwhelming financial and political force.

The slogan “vote blue no matter who” is a weapon of class oppression. It is a ideological tool used by the liberal bourgeoisie to demobilize the proletariat and channel genuine popular discontent back into the dead end of electoralism, ensuring that no matter which individual manages the state, the fundamental pillars of capitalism: private property, exploitation, and imperialism; remain untouched.

The party’s 26% approval rating is a sign of the masses’ growing, albeit often inchoate, recognition of this reality. Our task is not to mourn the betrayals of the Democratic Party, but to build the consciousness and independent political organization of the working class. Our answer is not to find a “better” capitalist manager, but to build the party capable of smashing the bourgeois state apparatus altogether and establishing the rule of the proletariat.

After 2014, Ukraine adopted a number of laws restricting the public sphere of the Russian language:

• In 2016-2017, language quotas were introduced on television and radio (up to 75% of content in Ukrainian), which reduced the presence of the Russian language in the media.
• In 2018, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine repealed the 2012 law “On the Fundamentals of State Language Policy” (known as the Kivalov-Kolesnichenko Act), which gave Russian the status of a regional language in areas with more than 10% of native speakers.
• The law “On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language” adopted in 2019 tightened the requirements for the use of Ukrainian in education, public services and the public sphere.

There was no direct ban on private use, but systemic restrictions in the public space raised concerns among Russian-speaking citizens about the future of their linguistic identity.

There are many issues with your comment.

“Putin had no problems in 2004” is incorrect. Russia’s reaction to the expansion of NATO in 2004 was immediate, harsh, and contained threats of specific counter-measures.

“In 2007, he suddenly got scared” is an incorrect interpretation. The Munich Speech of 2007 was not a sudden reaction of fear, but a thoughtful, ideological and strategic statement by a strengthened Russia. It marked the transition to a tougher and more independent foreign policy course based on rejection of American hegemony and an insistence on taking into account Russian security interests.

The rhetorical escalation was not the result of a sudden emotion, but the result of the accumulation of systemic contradictions, the unwillingness of the West to take into account Moscow’s concerns and the strengthening of Russia, which was ready to challenge the status quo that did not suit it.

Maybe from superhero movies or videogames

The standard liberal counterargument is that NATO is a voluntary defensive alliance operating on the basis of consensus. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is only really activated in the event of an attack on one of the members.

However, this argument is unconvincing for Russia for several reasons:

• Past experience, as NATO’s military operations in Yugoslavia (1999) without a UN mandate were perceived in Moscow as proof that the alliance could act offensively outside its territory.
• Changing doctrines, as knowledge of the evolution of NATO’s doctrines after the Cold War, including operations outside the territory of the participating countries, allows Russia to assert that the initially defensive nature of the alliance has changed.
• Missile defense system, because the deployment of the American missile defense system in Eastern Europe, although claimed as protection against the threat from Iran, is perceived by Moscow as part of an offensive strategic potential that undermines its nuclear deterrent.

Your thesis is impeccable from the point of view of international law and the normative (liberal) theory of international relations. It accurately identifies violations and tactics.

However, for a complete geopolitical picture, it must be supplemented by an analysis of the motives and strategic calculations of the other side (Russia), which, even if illegal, are the driving force of its actions.

Legal assessment and assessment from a position of strength are often in conflict, which is the essence of the modern geopolitical conflict.

Your comment is a prime example of the clash between two paradigms in understanding international relations:

• The Liberal-Idealist Paradigm, where conflicts arise from the violation of universal norms and rights. The solution is to isolate the aggressor, punish it, and support the victim. Morality and law are the main guiding principles. The comment is written from this perspective.

• The Realist Paradigm, from Classical Geopolitics, where international relations are an anarchic environment where states rationally (though sometimes erroneously) pursue their national interests based on security, power, and influence. From this viewpoint, moral assessments are useless for analysis; one must study the balance of power, geography, interests, and perceived threats.

You made a morally powerful but analytically poor statement. It accurately reflects the emotional mood of a significant part of the international community and serves as an important reminder of the human dimension of the conflict. However, as a tool for understanding what is happening and forecasting future events, it is useless and even harmful, as it calls for the abandonment of critical analysis in favor of pure moralizing. The task of a geopolitical expert is to synthesize both approaches: to be fully aware of the monstrous nature of events, while also coldly and rationally analyzing the mechanisms driving them.

Maybe Al Jazeera could be a more balanced source on this topic, for example: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/22/russia-ukraine-war-list-of-key-events-day-1275

This is a solid point but it kinda misses how fast things are changing. It’s totally true that solar started as a rich person’s backup generator, but that’s not the whole story anymore. The real shift is happening off-grid in developing countries. Places in Ethiopia and Nigeria are seeing solar become the main power source for entire villages, not just a backup, and it’s actually kickstarting local economies.

Also, the energy transition in Africa is way more complex than just connecting homes to the grid. A lot of people who are technically connected can’t even afford to use the power or it’s so unreliable they still use wood. The real opportunity is that renewables could actually drive massive development, like in Kenya and Morocco. The huge problem, though, is the insane lack of funding and the structural barriers holding everything back. They get almost none of the global investment needed to make this happen.

Your comment represents an emotional analogy rather than an analytical assessment. While such a metaphor may reflect someone’s subjective feelings, it is unsuitable for analyzing a complex geopolitical situation.

Russia is not a “schoolyard bully,” but a sovereign state with a centuries-old history, complex political processes, and a multifaceted foreign policy. Its actions on the international stage are based on specific national interests, security considerations, and historical context.

Oversimplified analogies that reduce complex international relations to schoolyard conflicts do not contribute to constructive dialogue or an understanding of real geopolitical dynamics.

The article is paywalled, here is a summary:

In May 2025, African countries imported a combined 1.57 gigawatts (GW) of solar panels from China, an all-time high. This monthly volume represents approximately three-quarters of the Hoover Dam’s capacity. Notably, this surge isn’t limited to relatively affluent nations like South Africa but includes at least 22 African countries that increased imports during the first five months of 2025, with most doubling their previous year’s numbers.

Algeria exemplifies this trend with a 6,300% increase in solar panel imports from China during the first half of 2025, reaching 0.76 GW. Even less developed countries like Chad have imported enough panels to theoretically replace their entire current power generation capacity.

China’s role as the global solar panel manufacturing leader is pivotal, producing over 80% of the world’s panels due to government subsidies, economies of scale, and technological advancements. While Europe and North America were previously the primary export markets, Africa is now emerging as a key destination.

Short answer: This isn’t about Putin, Zelensky, or Trump. It’s about millions of human lives. To honor that, we must seek a deep understanding of the history and context at play. Without that earnest effort, we should simply be silent.

Long answer: Eugene Rumer would likely emphasize that his task as an analyst is not to justify Putin’s actions, but to understand their causes and consequences. In his commentaries, he often stresses the need to soberly assess the motives and calculations of the Kremlin, even if they seem irrational or immoral. For example, in the context of the Kerch Strait incident, Rumer noted that the cancellation of the Trump-Putin meeting was a tactical move, not a fundamental change in course. This approach allows for forecasting Russia’s further actions, which is necessary for developing effective policy.

Rumer would argue that reducing Putin’s actions to mere desire for invasion and control oversimplifies Russia’s strategic calculus. Instead, he would frame it as:

• A cycle of action and reaction, because Russian aggression is often a response to perceived threats, but it reinforces the very insecurity it seeks to avoid.
• A call for nuanced policy, as the West must deter Russian aggression while addressing legitimate security concerns through diplomacy and arms control.

He would argue that Putin’s insistence on non-NATO neighbors is driven by deep-seated strategic culture and historical trauma, but it cannot justify violating sovereignty. A sustainable solution would require balancing deterrence with engagement to break the cycle of conflict

Rumer would contend that Russia’s actions in Crimea were driven by core strategic interests, not merely a response to Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation. He has noted that Russia felt “betrayed” by Western support for regime change in Kyiv and acted to protect its vital interests, which it saw as threatened by Ukraine’s potential alignment with the West. Even if Ukraine had declared neutrality, Russia would likely have pursued annexation to secure its Black Sea naval base in Sevastopol and assert dominance over what it considers its historical sphere of influence. Neutrality would not have addressed Russia’s perception of vulnerability or its ambition to reshape the regional order.

Rumer has highlighted that NATO enlargement, while not explicitly intended to threaten Russia, created a dynamic of hedging against Russian resurgence. Russia was never integrated into European security structures like Germany was after World War II, leading to a sense of exclusion and mistrust. He argues that the West lacked a coherent strategy for Russia after the Cold War, relying on hope rather than a realistic framework for engagement. Thus, Crimea’s annexation was a culmination of long-standing grievances, not a reaction to short-term provocations.

The author’s analysis suggests that Russia views Ukraine as a critical buffer zone and a symbol of its great-power status. He notes that the competition between the EU and Russia over Ukraine’s economic alignment became a zero-sum game, with Russia willing to use force to prevent Ukraine’s Western integration. Even neutrality would likely have been insufficient unless it explicitly guaranteed Russia’s dominance, which would contradict Ukrainian sovereignty and popular aspirations.

Your comment contains a lot of oversimplifications:

• The options are not limited to “fight in Ukraine” or “fight elsewhere later.” A spectrum of diplomatic, economic, and limited military responses exists along a continuum.
• As currently constituted, European militaries lack sufficient capacity to “fight Russia in Ukraine” in any direct sense without American participation, making the proposed choice somewhat theoretical.
• The statement fails to account for Russian nuclear threats that have successfully constrained Western military responses throughout the conflict. This factor would remain regardless of where confrontation with Russia occurs.

Many experts call for the pursuit of diplomatic pathways out of the stalemate to avoid a protracted war and further escalation. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has published numerous analytical pieces (e.g., by analyst Eugene Rumer) emphasizing that without realistic diplomatic negotiations about Europe’s future security architecture, the conflict risks turning into a frozen, yet smoldering phase for years to come.

https://www.cfr.org/article/neutrality-alternative-ukraines-membership-nato

An alternative scenario is a strategy that involves not “fighting the Russians in Ukraine” but maximally strengthening Europe’s own defensiveness and supporting Ukraine to strengthen its position in potential negotiations. Dr Barbara Kunz and Dan Smith from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), have noted that the EU and NATO’s long-term strategy should focus on scaling up their own defense production and capabilities, not just on supplying arms to Ukraine.

However, instead of focusing on the dynamics outlined above, today’s wider European security debate is very much about Russia’s alleged true essence as an imperial or colonial power. There is no doubt that Russia’s actions, which include invading a sovereign country, and its regime’s rhetoric are deeply worrying and unacceptable. But solely focusing on Russian identity for explanations overlooks the dynamic nature of international relations. Russia’s perceptions of the West and its actions are rarely discussed. Nor is how the West’s actions affect strategic stability. While Russia’s intentions are clearly a crucial factor for European security, debating Russia’s nature tends to be highly speculative.

https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/2024/nato-new-need-some-old-ideas

This is like killing natives in America and sending there people from Africa.

The West tried to destroy Russia with sanctions, but they failed. Now they are changing strategy. But they need another president for Ukraine for two reasons: Zelensky is the President of war, they need a president of peace, and the time for Zelensky to be president expired.