- cross-posted to:
- security@lemmy.ml
- technology@beehaw.org
- cross-posted to:
- security@lemmy.ml
- technology@beehaw.org
cross-posted from: https://midwest.social/post/9868784
SIM swappers have adapted their attacks to steal a target’s phone number by porting it into a new eSIM card, a digital SIM stored in a rewritable chip present on many recent smartphone models.
This says that they’re able to hijack the phone numbers by scanning a QR code to configure an eSIM. But doesn’t the carrier need to authenticate device swaps like that in the first place? If the carriers allow SIM swaps without anything more than a line of text, then that’s a major account security issue that I have to imagine has already been accounted for when this tech and the policies for it were developed. I feel like there’s some very important details missing to this.
From what I understand, the attackers steal your number by gaining access to your phone carrier account.
They can gain access to your account either by finding your info in a data breach, or by phishing the account details from you.
That’s why they say that you need to setup a strong password with 2FA for your phone carrier account to protect yourself from this kind of attack.
I was going to say, I’ve never needed to talk to my phone provider with a new eSIM, i just need to login to the app and confirm. That makes it the obvious route for sim stealers
Remember this, next time some says “I don’t need a good password. What are they going to do, pay my phone bill?”
Thanks for the advice! I just added 2FA to my phone carrier account.
That makes more sense. In which case, yeah this is just basic account security 101 stuff. Certain accounts in life you need to treat with extra security, and until we can wean society off of insecure SMS authentication services, your phone account is one of those that needs extra care put into it.
Before esim, a lot of sim swap attacks were done by bribing a rank-and-file support guy from the carrier to issue you a new sim. Nothing new here.